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This paper investigates whether the substitute compliance framework under the new US regime 
for over-the-counter derivatives has stimulated regulatory arbitrage. Results point to increased 
post-regulatory concentration in exposure in those countries in which US banks comply with 
local derivative regulation. 
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1. Introduction 
In the light of the global nature of derivative markets, the regulatory framework for 
Over-The-Counter (OTC) swaps, contained in the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA), sets forth an 
extraterritorial applicability to foreign transactions involving US financial institutions. Enacted 
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in 2013, the Interpretive Guidance 
on cross-border swaps regulations allows foreign branches of US banks to comply with local 
regulation via a substitute compliance framework in a number of jurisdictions with broadly 
comparable provisions1.  
This paper, focusing on the largest segment of swaps markets, that is, Interest Rate 
Swaps (IRS), investigates whether substitute compliance has resulted in regulatory arbitrage 
by foreign branches of US banks, tilting the playing field in favor of those countries in which 
the framework is available. Lagged implementation timing and/or marginally less stringent 
regulation in those jurisdictions where substitute compliance is available may indeed cause an 
increase in geographical concentration of swaps trading in favor of these latter (Artamonov, 
2015)2.  
Evidence on the implications of the DFA on swap markets is limited in the literature 
and focuses mainly on market liquidity (Benos et al., 2016; Loon and Zhong, 2016). This 
research is a first attempt to explore whether the DFA has stimulated cross-border regulatory 
arbitrage by US banks3. 
The investigation is based on a novel dataset encompassing IRS positions of foreign 
branches of US banks aggregated over by host-country, contained in the Foreign Branch Report 
of Condition available from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council  
(FFIEC030). Data is available quarterly for 23 countries over the period 2001q1-2015q3. 
Geographical shifts in favor of locations in which regulatory equivalence is available to EU 
banks featuring an analogous extraterritorial reach are also accounted for4. The IRS exposure 
of US banks may indeed increase in countries susceptible to witness a surge in the presence of 
their main competitors and counterparties, that is, EU banks, resulting from a parallel attempt 
to circumvent domestic regulation. 
Table 1 reports post-guidance growth rates of IRS exposure of branches of US banks 
in selected countries. Exposure in jurisdictions with substitute compliance/equivalence for 
either/both US or/and EU banks have increased with notable exception of Japan featuring fully-





                                                             
1Applicable from December-end 2013, the interpretative guidance is a not-binding policy statement indicating 
intentions of forthcoming legislation. The CFTC establishes regulatory comparability of foreign jurisdictions. 
2 See FSB (2014) for cross-country progress in OTC reforms. 
3 Research on cross-border regulatory arbitrage by banks is well-documented (Acharya et al., 2009; Carbo-
Valverde et al., 2012; Houston et al. 2012). 
4 See the European Market Infrastructure Regulation. 
Table 1: IRS exposure by host country, % 2014-2015 
  % Substitute Compliance/Equivalence? 
Australia 12 US,EU 
Canada 42 US,EU 
England -19 US 
Hong Kong 36 US,EU 
Japan -25 US,EU 
Singapore 32 EU 
South Korea 18 EU 
South Africa 6 EU 
Switzerland 63 US,EU 
Taiwan -37  
Bahamas -48  
Thailand -3  
China -20  
Philippines -16  
Source: FFIEC030.  
 
2. Empirical analysis 
The baseline model is: 
𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃𝑠(𝐷𝑠
𝑆𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝑅𝑐) + ∑ 𝑋𝑘,𝑖,𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (1) 
𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of IRS (notional amounts) to assets of branches located in host-country i, 
i=1,…,23.  𝐷𝑠𝑆𝐶   accounts for host country groupings, captured by s dummies, s=1,…,S 
allowing to assess geographical shifts either away from those locations with tighter regulations, 
such as European countries and Japan, or towards those jurisdictions in which substitute 
compliance/equivalence is available. European countries are captured by the dummy Europe; 
a dummy is also used for England. DUSnoEU contains countries, other than European, in 
which substitute compliance is available to branches of US banks. DEU identifies those 
locations, other than the US, in which regulatory equivalence is available to EU banks 5. 
Country dummies are also considered without Japan in the following identifiers: DUSnoJP and 






                                                             
5 Including those countries granted equivalence by the European Commission in both 2014 and 2015. 
Table 2: Country dummies 
Europe DUSnoEU DUSnoJP DEU DEUnoJP 
Italy Australia Australia Australia Australia 
Belgium Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong 
England Canada Canada Canada Canada 
Germany Japan Italy Japan Singapore 
France   Belgium Singapore Republic of Korea 
    England Republic of Korea South Africa 
    Germany South Africa   
    France     
 
TRc, c=US,EU are time dummy variables, capturing the timing of the extraterritorial 
applicability of derivative regulation in the US (2014q1-2015q3) and in the EU (2014q4-
2015q3). γi is a fixed-effect that captures unobserved host-country specific variables, such as 
differences in regulatory environment. Fixed-time period dummies are also included in the 
regression (unreported) to account for common time-varying effects on IRS exposures across 
the panel.  
Xi,t contains k=1,...,K control variables. The choice of the location of IRS trading of 
branches may not be necessarily driven by local economic conditions as counterparties are 
often located in third countries. Albeit a given jurisdiction’s macroeconomic stability and 
favourable regulation can stimulate local off-balance sheet activities, financial markets depth, 
sophistication and openness can also explain the locational choice of IRS trading. Financial 
openness (Opennessit) is proxied by host location i’s cross-border assets plus liabilities vis-à-
vis reporting banks as a share of host county’s GDP. Outstanding derivative positions on 
resident counterparties as a share of GDP (derivativesit) proxy for local financial development 
and sophistication. Inflation rates proxy for macroeconomic stability in i (inflationit) and the 
log of assets of branches in i (sizeit) controls for the relative importance of on-balance sheet 
activities. IRS exposure of banks arises primarily from market-making/dealing and interest rate 
risk management. Interest rate risk at the host-country level capturing the latter is proxied by 
the absolute value of one minus the loans-to-deposit ratio (IRrisk).   
 
3. Results 
Table 3 presents the regression estimates of (1) for different specifications. The 
coefficient of Europe*TrUS in column (1) shows that in the US post-regulation era the IRS 
exposure of foreign branches of US banks in Europe has declined 6.5% more than in other 
locations. This fall is particularly important for branches located in England whose IRS 
exposure was 22% lower than elsewhere over the same period, as reported in column (2).  
Specifications in columns (3)-(8) capture those locations in which a framework of 
substitute compliance/equivalence is available to either US and/or EU banks. Column (4) 
considers exclusively the pre-guidance period (i.e. TrUS=0) in order to test whether IRS 
exposure of US banks had not been growing at a faster rate before 2014 in those countries in 
which substitute compliance was available. Column (8) considers the marginal effects on IRS 
exposure in the subgroup of countries, other than Japan, in which both US and European banks 
can rely on local derivative regulations, i.e. in Australia, Hong Kong and Canada.  
The estimated coefficients of the different country interaction dummies in 
specifications (3)-(8) are all positive and strongly significant. However, when comparing pre- 
and post-guidance increase in IRS exposure in those countries with substitute compliance in 
relation to other foreign locations (DUSnoEU definition, columns 3 and 4), post-guidance 
levels were significantly higher. Overall, evidence points to a more pronounced, i.e. when 
compared to other locations, post-regulatory increase in IRS exposure of branches of US banks 
located in those countries in which substitute compliance/equivalence is either available to 
them or to branches of EU banks. This geographical shift is particularly important in those 
countries, other than Japan, in which equivalence is available to EU banks, as reported in 
column (7), in which IRS exposure has increased 9% more than elsewhere since early 2014. 
This evidence suggests a swift response of US banks to move a large part of their off-balance 
sheet activities to those countries more susceptible to accommodate a higher volume of swap 
trading by their major competitors and counterparties. The subset of jurisdictions, other than 
Japan, in which branches of both EU and US banks can comply with local OTC regulation 
depict the highest post-guidance increase in IRS exposure: about 9.4% higher than elsewhere 
(column 8).  
The estimated coefficients of the control variables reveal that macroeconomic stability 
is an important determinant of the location of IRS exposure by foreign branches of US banks.   
The negative and strongly significant coefficient of on-balance sheet assets (in logs), i.e. sizei,t, 
uncovers a geographical polarization of on and off-balance sheet activities of branches of US 
banks. The nonsignificant coefficient of IRrisk reflects the fact that IRS exposure is largely due 
to dealing and market-making rather than to insure from the interest rate risk that arises from 
local activities.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The 2007-09 global financial crisis has uncovered the potential threats to domestic 
financial stability posed by excessive risk taken by foreign offices of global banks. The 
extraterritorial clause contained in the OTC swaps regulation, set out in the DFA, reflects the 
intent of US regulators to prevent further large scale bailouts such as that of American 
International Group in 2008 caused by the excessive swaps exposure by its London office. 
While the new regulatory framework aims to discourage geographical concentration of risk by 
US banks, loopholes arising from substitute compliance frameworks available for US banks 
may create new geographical hubs for swaps trading. The findings in this paper point to 
significant relocation of IRS exposure of branches of US global banks away from traditional 
locations, such as England, and in favor of those countries in which US and/or EU banks can 
comply with local OTC derivatives market regulation.  This evidence points to the existence 




Table 3 Panel regression  
Dependent variable: IRS notional amounts to assets in time t 
 (1) (2) (3) 
(4) 
TrUS=0 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Europe*TrUS -6.483**   (2.032)               
England*TrUS   -22.414***   (7.524)             
DUSnoEU*TrUS     5.592***   (0.712)           
DUSnoEU       0.094***   (0.010)         
DEU*TrUS         6.964***   (1.031)       
DEU*TrEU           7.222***   (1.454)     
DEUnoJP*TrUS             9.208***   (1.340)   
DUSnoJP*DEU*Tr
US 
              
9.374***   
(1.175) 



















-0.169***   
(0.040) 
-0.157***   
(0.036) 
-0.166***   
(0.038) 
-0.117***   
(0.036) 
-0.155***   
(0.037) 
-0.44***   
(0.037) 
-0.140***   
(0.037) 
-0.163***   
(0.038) 
Opennessi,t 
-0.002***        
(0.001) 
-0.002***        
(0.001) 
-0.001**        
(0.001) 
-0.000        
(0.001) 
-0.001        
(0.001) 
-0.001*        
(0.001) 
-0.001        
(0.001) 
-0.001*        
(0.001) 
Sizei,t 
-3.038***   
(0.216) 
-2.983***   
(0.212) 
-3.316***   
(0.218) 
-3.759***   
(0.231) 
-3.346***   
(0.227) 
-3.253***   
(0.225) 
-3.423***   
(0.244) 



















Host country fixed 
effect 
x x x x x x x x 
Fixed time dummy x x x x x x x x 
Observations 1426 1426 1426 1242 1426 1426 1426 1426 
R2 0.794 0.804 0.793 0.818 0.797 0.794 0.801 0.797 
Adjusted R2 0.781 0.791 0.779 0.806 0.783 0.781 0.788 0.783 
Notes: This Table reports the estimates of panel regressions over the period 2000q2-2015q3. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 ***,**,* refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively .   
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